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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1952-53 TERM
still claim the child even after legal adoption has been granted, 0
the burden then rests upon the parent to show that the child's welfare will be advanced by having the child returned to her."
In the instant case there was no showing that the mother was
unfit to care for her child. In fact, to the contrary there had been
evidence introduced on the trial to show her fitness. Since the
order of adoption of the child had already been vacated in a previous proceeding because of the lack of consent of the mother,
it was natural that the court gave the custody of the child to the
mother.
Abrogation of Adoption
In New York, to effectuate an abrogation of an adoption there
must be a finding that "due regard to the interests of both (the
child and the foster parents) requires that such adoption be abrogated. 112 In order for a parent to obtain the abrogation, he must
show that the child has been guilty of the willful desertion or a
misdemeanor or ill behavior. The law goes on to state that when
such an abrogation is sought, notice must be given to the agency
which was a party to the adoption, or if no agency was involved,
to the board or commission or official with the jurisdiction over
the poor. If no such agency or institution shall appear on the
return of such process, then a special guardian shall be appointed
by the court.' 3
In In re Adoption of Eaton,4 the parents of an adopted person, their daughter, were seeking the abrogation of adoption on
the ground of desertion. The daughter had attained majority,
had married, left home and had not been heard of since. In the
action she appeared by counsel. The court held that once the
adopted person had attained majority, no longer could there possibly be an abrogation of the adoption.' 5 The court looked into
the provisions of § 118 of the Domestic Relations Law to interpret
the intent of the statute and found that it applied only to minor
children. First of all, the violations upon which the abrogation
can be sought pertain only to infractioias of those duties which are
owed by a child to a parent during infancy. Further, the agency
which was a party to the adoption must be present to insure that
10. People ex rel. Pickle v. Pickle, 215 App. Div: 32, 213 N. Y. Supp. 70 (4th
Dep't 1925).
11. Matter of Thorne, 240 N. Y. 444, 148 N. E. 630 (1925).
12. Dot. REL. LAW § 118.
13. Ibid.
14. 305 N. Y. 162, 111 N. E.2d 431 (1953).
15. The court did not express itself or determine the abrogation of an adoption
procured by fraud or any other infirmity in connection with the adoption itself. See
Myer's v. Myers, 197 App. Div. 1, 188 N. Y. Supp. 527 (1st Dep't 1921).
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the infant will be adequately represented or the court will appoint
a special guardian (who would be granted for an infant) to protect such infant's interests. Finally, the statute relates that the
judge or surrogate may make such disposition for the foster child
as he may deem proper; there would definitely be little or no need
for this if the intent was to make the section applicable to adult
adoptees. Furthermore, elsewhere in the statute there have been
definite distinctions made in the treatment of adult adoptees, in
contrast to infant adoptees, as to the manner of conduct and proceedings for them."8
The court in summing up the probable intent of the legislature in providing for the abrogation of adoptions thus said,"
.
the necessity for terminating an adoption is so unlikely, that the
threat of so drastic a court remedy should not overhang the adopted child's whole adult life.' 7
B. Husband-Wife
iiharriage,Common Law
Common law marriage was abolished in New York State as
of 29 April 1933 by Domestic Relations Law 4 11 which states
that a valid marriage must be solemnized.'
But § 11 does not
spell out a retroactive effect, and since it is in derogation of the
common law, it has been held not to be retroactive and so common
law marriages entered into prior to 29 April 1933 are valid. 2 To
establish a common law marriage the prime factor is an intent of
the parties to enter into the marriage contract 23 with an ability
on the part of both parties to enter the relationship 24 and an open
assumption of marital duties and obligations or a promise and
25
cohabitation.
The Court of Appeals twice deliberated upon the sufficiency
of evidence from which a common law marriage could be inferred.
16. Dom. REL. L.w Art. VII, §§ 109, 110, 111, 112, 113. 116, 117.
17. See note 14 supra.
21. As amended L. 1933, c.606: Ferrarov. Ferraro,77 N. Y. S. 2d 246 (Dom. Rel.
Ct 1948).
22. In re Makel's Estate. 153 -Misc. 228, 274 N. Y. Supp. 625 (Surr. Ct. 1934).

23. Akeson v. Salvage Process Corp., 305 N. Y. 438, 441, 113 N. E. 2d 788, 789;

Zy v. Zy, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 415 (Dona. Rel. Ct. 1939) ; see GROSSTAN, THE NEW YORIC
L.Aw OF DoMESTzIc RELATIONS § 92 (Ist ed. 1947).

24. A common disability is a prior valid marriage. Castellani v. Castellani, 176
Misc. 763, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 879 (Dor. Rel. Ct. 1941) ; Karairerosv. Luther, 166 Misc.
376, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 508 (Sup. Ct. 1938), af'd, 254 App. Div. 845, 5 N. Y. S. 2d 319
(1st Dep't 1938).
25. Inre Monty's Estate, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 705 (Surr. Ct. 1941), affd, 289 N. Y. 685,
45 N. E. 2d 334 (1942). Anonymous v. Anonymous, 19 N. Y. S. 2d 229 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
1940). Zy v. Zy, supra note 23; Heidig v. Heidig, 6 N. Y. S. 2d 405 (Sup. Ct 1938);
Castellani v. Castellani, supra note 24; Karamos v. Luther, supra note 24; see GROSSMAx, oP. cit. supra note 23 §§ 90-99.

